

VZCZCXRO8721
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0236/01 0240714
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240714Z JAN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5660
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3563
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000236

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [MCAP](#) [MOPS](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PHUM](#) [AF](#)
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: HELMAND GOVERNOR UNVEILS
PROTOCOLS FOR DISTRICT SHURA APPROVAL

REF: 06 KABUL 5638

KABUL 00000236 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Helmand Governor Wafa has commenced his outreach to tribal leaders through a series of meetings with district shuras. In each meeting, Wafa has presented his "protocols," which are conditions the shura must accept before the Governor will give his approval and support. The conditions generally require the shura to recognize central government authority, support government and coalition security forces, support reconstruction and development, and oppose anti-government forces. Wafa has met with at least five shuras so far and reports favorable reactions, with the Naw Zad shura signing a copy of the protocols. The effort to have a systematic approach with a core focus on asserting central GOA authority is one we support. The Musa Qala shura denied the Governor's claim that it accepted the protocols but is giving the agreement further consideration. Intransigence by the Musa Qala shura could pose one of the first tests for the new Governor. Nevertheless, Wafa's approach is cutting off the previous risk that the Musa Qala precedent would spread and create broad swaths of territory closed to ISAF and ANSF. The trend is positive. END SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU) Governor Wafa has commenced his tribal outreach in Helmand, for which he received mixed reviews during his tenures in Kunar and Paktia provinces. Following a provincial jirga on January 10, during which he exhorted the hundreds assembled to reject foreign fighters and accept government authority, Wafa met separately with shuras from the districts of Naw Zad, Washir, Musa Qala, Garmsir and Nad Ali. He plans to meet with shuras from all thirteen districts in Helmand.

¶3. (SBU) In each meeting, Wafa presented to the elders a list of requirements (see paragraph 8) and described the items listed as "protocols," rather than a proposed agreement. He insisted that the list consists of conditions for the shuras to meet with no corresponding obligations imposed on the government. Wafa does make one concession --

permitting the shura to appoint the district head -- though he retains the power to appoint a head if he deems the shura's appointee unqualified. Wafa expects, or rather, demands that the shura accept and abide by the list as a condition for enjoying his recognition and cooperation. He feels that he has a mandate from Kabul to pursue these protocols.

¶4. (SBU) According to Wafa, the Naw Zad shura has accepted the conditions and signed a copy to demonstrate this. The shuras of Washir and Nad Ali, Wafa claimed, reacted favorably but have not formally accepted. He also claimed that the Sangin shura reacted positively, but he assessed the elders in attendance were lacking sufficient influence in the district to guarantee compliance, and he told them to return with a stronger shura.

¶5. (SBU) Wafa asked the Musa Qala shura to consider the protocols and claimed that the shura later accepted them. In a meeting with members of the PRT, the shura denied that they had accepted the protocols. The shura head asserted that it already had an agreement with the government. However, the shura agreed to raise the matter with others in the district.

¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: The new Governor has wasted little time in reaching out to the tribal leaders and has staked out a strong position on the centrality of the government in provincial affairs. He says this is non-negotiable. The generally favorable reaction he reports is therefore a positive sign. Expectations for full delivery on the protocols should be kept modest, however, as the ability of district shuras to adhere to or deliver on a number of provisions, at least in the short term, is limited. It is not entirely clear why a shura would accept the protocols, given that nearly all obligations fall on the shura. The

KABUL 00000236 002.2 OF 002

list might be attractive simply because the government is turning to the shura for guarantees, a move which could increase their influence and possibly access to resources. Being able to appoint a district head could make that office more answerable to the shura and more responsive to the community at large.

¶7. (SBU) COMMENT continued: Musa Qala-type agreements, which limit the government's influence and presence, no longer appears to be an option available to the districts. Still unclear is the effect of the protocols on the Musa Qala agreement. If acceptance of the protocols is not taken as negation of the Musa Qala agreement, then it could constitute an amendment that strengthens the government's position, something most shura members likely would not want. Although it remains to be seen what the district's "second shura" decides (REFTEL). The shura's intransigence could present one of the first real tests for the new Governor. END COMMENT

¶8. (SBU) Protocols: The following list was transcribed during a meeting the Governor had with a PRT representative. The Governor has not provided the PRT with a formal, written copy of the requirements.

- The people have to work with each other under the GOA flag.
- Shura leaders are to obey and respect the law of the GOA and follow the constitution.
- The elders must give priority to security in the district.
- The elders must guarantee to defeat the operations of all Enemy Forces.
- The elders must help in supporting reconstruction and development work.
- The elders must remain in touch with the PRT and Gov.
- Taxes must be paid to central government.
- The elders will receive some operational funding from the Government.
- The elders must work with the GOA to provide education for

people and promise not to destroy any schools.
-- The elders must give a guarantee of safety for ANA, ANP, PRT and NGOs.
-- The elders must guarantee that coalition forces can go anywhere without needing to ask for permission and without facing problems.
-- The elders must promise not to provide a sanctuary for the TB within the district.
-- There must be no alternative (read Taliban) administration or courts.
-- The Ulema and elders must work to reconcile those who are against the GOA.
-- No one will be allowed to carry weapons and if caught they will be arrested and charged.
-- The elders must work with the refugees to return to their homeland.
-- The Gov will appoint officials to work with the district Shura.
-- The Chief of Police must be professional and chosen by the government.
-- Those in government departments must follow the agenda of the central government.
-- Volunteers for the ANP must be trained and must be from all the tribes in the district.
-- The elders must obey all the conditions required by the GOA.
-- Those working on development must have their security guaranteed.
-- The Shura must be controlled by the central government (the Gov,s office).
-- The District Chief, chosen by the Shura, must be educated; if not he will be appointed by the Governor.

NEUMANN